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In March 2004 I attended the Inaugural International Conference on Longevity at the Sydney
Exhibition and Convention Centre in Darling Harbour. Visiting this event was, for me, a way
of taking stock of what it means to live in an ageing society. As a cultural researcher interested
in the interactions between demographic shifts, capitalist globalisation and changing forms
of political power, the prospect of a direct encounter with the debates and practices
surrounding the burgeoning field of anti-ageing medicine promised a means to observe
the complex cultural dynamics of population ageing in action. From the moment I set foot
in the conference, I was unsure whether I had entered a public forum or a private market-
place. As I stayed on, it became clear not only that these two things, in this context as in so
many others, are becoming one and the same, but also that this tendency does not issue in
dialectical synthesis or a race to history’s end. What I witnessed was discord, a quarrel
that, despite the march of technological advance, attests the ongoing conflict in the nexus
where politics meets life.
Outside the main auditorium was a showroom filled with an intriguing array of booths
and exhibits. The whole spectrum of anti-ageing products and services was on display: from
nutraceuticals and cosmeceuticals marketed by companies with names like Bioconcepts and
Metagenics to infrared saunas, energised water, testosterone patches and courses in ‘inte-
grative medicine’ offered in partnership with the American Academy of Anti-Ageing Medi-
cine (A4M). What I encountered upon entering the auditorium was strikingly different. Four
senior US biogerontologists were launching an attack on the very kinds of goods and prac-
tices being promoted outside. Among the speakers were Jay Olshansky, Bruce Carnes and
Leonard Hayflick, authors of a position statement entitled ‘No Truth to the Fountain of Youth’
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published in Scientific American in 2002 and signed by an international roster of 51 scien-
tists and physicians.1 Hayflick, in particular, gave a memorable talk. Declaring that no inter-
vention can stop, slow or reverse the ageing process in humans, he repeated his well-known
and authoritative claim that the phenomenon of cell death or apoptosis reflects an intrinsic
limit to the human biological life span.2 But, after the papers were delivered and Olshansky
had awarded what he called the Silver Fleece Award for anti-ageing quackery to an A4M
developed product named Prime Blends™, something interesting began to happen. One
after another, audience members rose to their feet to contest the scientists’ claims, to declare
that it wasn’t so for them, and even to publicly announce their intention to live for extended
periods—until 150 years, in one case. It was over a year later that I discovered that Ronald
Klatz and David Goldman, the founders of A4M, had launched a defamation suit against
Olshansky for his antics at this conference.3
Clearly, I had walked onto contested ground. But what is at stake in these quarrels over
anti-ageing medicine? And what interest might they have for the cultural researcher, who
worries less about the technical viability of the goods and services promoted by the anti-
ageing industry than the complex social and cultural circumstances that have led to the
unprecedented expansion in this field. I have to admit to a certain discomfort not only with
the scene I encountered but also with the motives that drew me to it. The very notion of con-
ducting a project on anti-ageing cultures had, for me, been a way of combining work in a
socially relevant area that might attract funding with an ongoing theoretical and political
interest in that loose array of discourses on contemporary global capitalism and power
that arrange themselves under the name biopolitics. My presence at the conference was
thus conditioned by a series of pressures, including the current administration of knowledge
in academic settings, which left me conflicted about the approaches I was making and infor-
mation I was absorbing. Indeed, my visit occurred in the period between the time I had
applied for funding to conduct research on anti-ageing medicine and the time I learned that
the application was successful. Not only was I conflicted but I was also tentative. Without
the knowledge that I would be supported to conduct the project, I could not identify myself
as a researcher in the field and consequently I did not see myself as operating undercover.
Despite this in-between state, I was thinking ahead. Cultivating an interest in anti-ageing
medicine, I realised, would likely project me in several different directions at once: liaising
with policy experts with interests in ageing, interviewing affluent appearance-conscious
women in their forties, holding my own in erudite discussions with philosophers and politi-
cal theorists, reading up on medical journals to address audiences of gerontologists, con-
versing with activists about the significance of population ageing for global finance or border
control, responding with an all-too-ironic sardonicism when asked about my research
over coffee or at a party. Yet, in none of these roles (and by now I have performed them
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all), could I imagine myself at ease, partly because it seemed that, in each case, my inter-
locutors would quickly sense the investments and attitudes that compelled me toward the
others. This feeling of unease, I would venture, is constitutive for the cultural researcher.
And it conditions, at least for me, a moment of resistance as well as a moment of assent to
the particular act of intellectual branding that the editors of this special issue of Cultural
Studies Review seek to carry out.
Such branding exercises are, no doubt, crucial to the ongoing viability of contemporary
humanities research, and, particularly, to the game of securing state patronage. But this game,
insofar as the Australian state obliges universities to act as corporate enterprises in the global
neoliberal environment, is not without its political consequences. Aside from the ministerial
vetoes and the ever more refined techniques of research auditing, there is, at the very least,
a need to operate simultaneously in other contexts and networks, creating openings for new
modes of sociality, organisation, and intellectual and political association. The extent to which
cultural research, given current institutional conditions (not least the growing prevalence of
precarious labour and speeded-up, performance-managed rhythms of work), can operate in
both these fields remains an open question.4 In any case, the tensions and contradictions I
was experiencing at the longevity conference are not isolated incidents but ambiguities
inherent to the conduct of cultural research as an engaged social practice.
Anti-ageing wars
Whatever the predicament of cultural research, it is not the only area of contemporary inquiry
that remains indelibly split, perpetually, as it were, at odds with itself. The very presence, at
the Darling Harbour conference, of both anti-ageing advocates and their agonists suggests
the presence of common interests, shared assumptions, and perhaps even overlapping con-
stituencies. Indeed, in a recent article published in the Journal of Gerontology, social geron-
tologist Robert Binstock argues that the attack on anti-ageing medicine by established
gerontological researchers is partly motivated by competition for patients, funding, power
and legitimacy.5 Such an assessment certainly makes sense, given that geriatric medicine in
both the US and Australia is a specialty having difficulty reproducing itself. Despite popu-
lation ageing trends and a shortage of specialists, recruitment to training positions in this
field is lagging far behind projected needs.6 Meanwhile, market research indicates rapid
growth in the demand for anti-ageing products and services.7 It would seem that the struggle
I had walked in on was symptomatic of wider shifts in the health care industry and, in
particular, of changes that have led to a blossoming consumer market for the so-called baby
boom generation.
To approach the controversy in this way, however, is already to understand it in terms
wider than its own. For participants in this debate, what is at stake is the technical possibility
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of extending the human life span. Since 1998, when James A. Thomson announced that
he had successfully isolated human embryonic stem cells capable of continuous division
in culture, there has been both renewed hope for and hype about the possibilities for human
life span extension.8 Although largely unrealised in clinical applications, the promise of stem
cell research to uncover a kind of latent ‘surplus’ life in even the most aged bodies has fed
the dream of prolongevity.9 Anti-ageing websites display news about biotechnological develop-
ments, reporting not only on stem cell science but also on other areas of research such as tis-
sue engineering, cloning, and telomere maintenance.10 In this way, the biotechnological
imaginary extends across and adds legitimacy to the diverse and contradictory forms of anti-
ageing practice, whether they involve regular preventive health procedures, endocrinology,
pharmaceuticals, alternative and complementary medicines, dietary and fitness regimes, cos-
metic treatments or any other number of therapies from protein boosters to steroids.
In fact, it is this combination of anti-ageing treatments (and the entrepreneurial culture
that often surrounds them) that attracts the criticism of the gerontological establishment.
The issues here concern not only the technical validity of popular anti-ageing claims to slow
or reverse the ageing process but also the prejudicial implications of the term anti-ageing,
the uneven access to new technologies and the protection of consumers from fraudulent
marketing activities.11 As Moody observes, however, these questions do not shed light on
the wider ethical dilemma of whether a general extension of the human life span is a desir-
able social outcome or not.12
A number of issues are typically raised in this regard. First, there is the question of whether
longer life spans will correspond to improved health and quality of life. Most biogerontol-
ogists and practitioners of geriatric medicine strive toward the compression of morbidity—i.e.
the shortening of the period of infirmity at the end of life.13 Similarly, as a recent study
conducted in Los Angeles suggests, most self-identifying anti-ageing practitioners aim ‘for
the goal of optimizing health and bodily experience’.14 But it remains an open question as
to whether attempts to decelerate or arrest the ageing process will facilitate a decreased period
of infirm senescence. The question is crucial not only because of its economic implications
but also because recent demographic research suggests that population ageing, while initially
entailing an improvement of the health status and health behaviour of ageing people, will
eventually lead to the emergence of very old and frail populations.15 Not surprisingly, anti-
ageing advocates are quick to equate their own practice with the promotion of healthy
ageing, but this still leaves aside the issue of whether enhanced human longevity should
be encouraged.
Another approach to this question is speculative. In her book Aging, Death and Human
Longevity, philosopher Christine Overall rejects cost-benefit arguments about human ageing
to ask how the advocacy of prolongevity leads us to question ‘the limits now placed on the
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development of human potential’.16 Her work presents a thought experiment that stipulates
the existence of an effective anti-ageing treatment accessible to all. Taking task with apologists
such as US Surgeon General Leon Kass, for whom the possibility of life span extension
robs humanity of a finitude that lends it dignity, morality and spirituality, she offers a
(qualified) endorsement of prolongevity. But she also notes how the aspiration to living ever
longer lives raises far-reaching questions: ‘What sorts of persons should we human beings
seek to become? What sort of lives should we live, and how, if at all, is the length of our lives
related to what is possible and desirable for us?’17 As useful as Overall’s approach is for bringing
the question of ageing back to first-order philosophical principles, it leaves begging the ques-
tion of how to translate these principles into practical everyday judgements. No less than
the approach that interests itself only in technological possibilities for human life span exten-
sion, the social and cultural are left in second place. It thus becomes difficult to ask how,
in a world of limited resources and entrenched social opinions, we should resolve issues such
as whether to fund stem cell research or allow physicians to prescribe drugs that promise
prolongevity.
The work of examining the changing technical conditions for human ageing in combination
with the actual, quotidian business of social life in ageing societies has only just begun. This
means examining how social and cultural practices precede and are embedded within tech-
no-scientific innovations as well as asking how emergent transformations in the meanings
of life, animation and vitality are played out at the level of lived social interactions. Cultural
research, for its part, has a significant contribution to make in this regard. First, because it
offers a multi-methodological approach, which cuts and combines qualitative techniques
such as unstructured interviews and focus groups with wide-ranging discourse analysis and
sophisticated theoretical frameworks. Such interdisciplinary combination has the poten-
tial to yield results and insights that may be unobtainable through limited disciplinary inves-
tigations. Second, cultural research effectively folds micro- into macro-analysis, ranging
across all scales—beginning, in the case of the study of anti-ageing cultures, at the sub-cellular
level of molecular biology and extending to the transnational space of global flows. But,
notwithstanding its declared attraction to the investigation of complex and socially relevant
problems, cultural research has been quite slow to take up the issue of ageing.
Indeed, cultural research has, since the early days, been inversely pulled to the analysis
of youth cultures. The fledgling field of cultural gerontology at once departs from this youth
focus and holds a profound kinship relation to it.18 It draws upon methodological lessons
forged in the analysis of youth subcultures, privileging (but not focusing exclusively upon)
the cultural circumstances of older people. This is because, in the contemporary world, it is
not only the aged who live in ageing societies. The cultural effects of the current demographic
shift, which in Australia will double the percentage of the population aged over 65 by 2050,
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are not restricted to the oldest in the population.19 Indeed, to study the cultural significance
of this shift deeply, it is necessary to question the very notion of ‘the population’ and to ask
what the term demos is doing in a word like demography.20
The sovereign and nationalist assumptions that lie behind our very language for describ-
ing the collective dimensions of ageing should alert us to the complex and contradictory
connections between biological processes and the mechanisms of governance in today’s global-
ising world. Anti-ageing medicine is one particular ‘culture of ageing’ (perhaps one can more
accurately say a ‘subculture of ageing’ that is becoming rapidly more mainstream) that emerges
with the social and cultural shifts occasioned by the decline of the social state and the impact
of globalisation. As Wilson points out, traditional ways of growing old are undergoing rapid
transformation as a result of global pressures.21 Profound changes in labour relations, social
programs, retirement and demographic patterns, as well as the cultural and medical stretch-
ing of middle age into later life have led to a reorganisation and reconceptualisation of the
life course in advanced capitalist societies.22 It is in the context of these changing patterns
that the current disputes over anti-ageing medicine, the so-called ‘war on anti-ageing medi-
cine’, becomes legible—the squabble that I witnessed at Darling Harbour as much as the
high profile debates in Scientific American and other venues.23
The biopolitics of ageing
Ageing is a multidimensional process with multiple interlaced effects upon the biological,
cultural, social, political and economic planes. Rooted in natural processes of ontogenetic
development (which, at a certain level, humans share with animals and plants), ageing takes
place in cultural, social, political and economic contexts that interact with each other in com-
plex ways and, in turn, react back into biological processes to shape the condition of the
body over time. As living beings, we all experience ageing at the somatic level and, to date,
all humans have eventually faced the moment of death, however that might be recognised
or defined. But the ways in which we age differ greatly—by gender, race, and class most
obviously, but also by historical experiences that effect generational cohorts and the con-
tingencies of individual biographies. As Brennan explains, the ‘thing that varies (how we
age) is not the same as the thing that is varied (the fact of ageing)’.24 While the fact of ageing
is presented to us as biologically self-evident, the social and cultural variations in how we
age clearly have a material existence that involves something more than somatic biology. It
is at this level of material immanence that the ageing process criss-crosses that of global-
isation. The politics of migration, the surge in biotechnology, the deregulation of financial
markets, the changing face of labour: all have important implications for ageing but can-
not be understood in isolation from currently unfolding changes in the global organisation
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of capitalism. At least this is the case in the contemporary world, where flows of people,
goods, money and technology move across national boundaries with varying degrees of ease,
challenging the sovereign authority of nation-states and profoundly altering the way in which
political power is wielded over life.
That the current ageing of the world’s population has planetary implications is beyond
dispute. In 1994, the World Bank issued a report entitled Averting the Old Age Crisis: Policies
to Protect the Old and Promote Growth, warning of an impending crisis in productivity as post
World War II birth rates began to decline and a growing portion of the world’s population,
both in ‘advanced’ and ‘developing’ countries, was no longer engaged in productive work.25
It is largely for this reason that nation-states have experienced population ageing as a threat,
so much so that they have willingly surrendered some aspects of their sovereign power to
divest themselves of responsibility for the future consequences of demographic change. This
process has taken different paths in different jurisdictions, including the devolution of
age-care services to the municipal level (in Sweden), the partial transfer of responsibility for
the maintenance of the elderly to communities and networks of ‘social capital’ (in British
Third-Way politics), and the reform of pension systems to oblige investment on global
financial markets (in almost every advanced capitalist country), But, in all of these cases,
population ageing places a glacier-like pressure on the nation-state, slowly eroding its cen-
tralised apparatuses for managing the production and reproduction of life.
To understand these transformations, it is not enough to view the processes of ageing
through the lens of globalisation. It is necessary also to work in the other direction, or to
view the processes of globalisation through the lens of ageing.26 As a first step, this means
locating global processes in relation to complex changes that occur in the nexus where
politics meets life. As is well known, Michel Foucault introduced the term biopolitics to
describe the integration, at the beginning of the modern era, of life itself into the mechanisms
and calculations of power.27 Foucault studied the ways in which state authorities, along with
many others, took on the task of the management of life through the introduction of systems
for education, policing, welfare, health care and so on. His discussion of biopolitics was
notoriously brief, ceding almost immediately to the work on governmentality, which then
gave way to the analysis of liberal government. But the moment of biopolitics marks a crucial
break in his oeuvre, one that has been interpreted variously, particularly as regards the key
divisions introduced in his later writings: sovereignty/governmentality and discipline/control.
Throughout these debates, however, there has been a tendency to approach life itself as an
object rather than a process, something that can be added or subtracted (as in the debates
on abortion, cloning, or euthanasia).28 And thus even the most sophisticated biopolitical
investigations tend to ignore the ageing process and/or life course.29 The challenge now is
not simply to bring the theoretical discourses surrounding biopolitics to the analysis of ageing,
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but (with this shift in the object of analysis) to rethink the epistemological and ontological
grounds of the concept itself.
There is no better illustration of the changing biopolitical arrangements surrounding ageing
than the shifts in the organisation of pension schemes over the past twenty-five years.30 Who
would have thought that thirty-five years after May 1968, the streets of Paris would rock
with protests against pension reforms. But that is what happened in May 2003 when hun-
dreds of thousands flooded the streets to protest Raffarin’s proposed changes to pension
policy, which aimed to make workers contribute for longer before being able to claim a pension.
Such schemes, combined with heightening the retirement age and/or tax incentives for older
workers, have become de rigueur in the wealthy capitalist countries. Many governments have
introduced measures that require or compel retirement saving, predominantly through invest-
ment on global financial markets. Whether this involves mandatory private account schemes
(as in Australia), centralised programs in which the state invests the bulk of funds (as in
Sweden), or the market expansion of private insurance and employer managed schemes (as
in the US), the result is a massive increase in the total asset holdings for retirement pur-
poses. Blommestein points to a threefold increase in the financial assets of OECD pension
funds in the period 1990–98, making them the largest stakeholders in the global financial
system.31 Not only has there been a growth in overall size of pension assets, but there has
also been a shift in the investment allocation of such funds toward higher yield, riskier assets,
such as equities. Already the uncertain consequences of this market exposure have been wit-
nessed in the Enron crisis, where the holders of 401k pension plans (retirement contribu-
tions paid in the form of company stock) were the net losers.32
The particular combination of state-mandated discipline and global capitalist control that
characterises these changes to pension schemes places the ageing person in a vulnerable
situation. As Phillipson points out, ageing becomes less about collective social responsibility
and more about individual risk.33 There has been a withdrawal of state provision and a ceding
of control to the flexible networks of the global financial system. This movement would seem
to confirm the tendency, which many commentators locate in the late Foucault, to argue that
the coercive power of sovereignty historically gives way to a decentred form of govern-
mental rationality that produces subjects who act in accordance, if not in agreement, with
forms of political power.34 But another story can be told about ageing if considered not from
the perspective of globalisation-from-above (neoliberal finance capitalism) but globalisation-
from-below (the expanding multitude of migrant passages). According to the controversial
Replacement Migration report published by the United Nations Population Division, which
studied the demographic situation in eight countries with low fertility and mortality, there
is a need in most wealthy nations for large increases in migration by the year 2050 to
maintain current ratios of workers to the over-65 population.35 But this is not the path being
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pursued by the advanced capitalist countries, which have been involved in increased efforts
to police their borders and control the flow of migrants, efforts that have only been redoubled
in the current climate of the ‘war against terror’.36
While economists and demographers argue over the extent to which migration can offset
population ageing in wealthy nations, the mounting pressure of ageing in the developing
world, coupled with increasing inequalities in the international divisions of wealth and labour,
suggests that the flow of migrants to the global north is unlikely to slow.37 As Sassen points
out, the developed countries have almost universally chosen the path of strict border con-
trol, seeking out skilled professionals but excluding vast numbers of economic migrants and
refugees, thereby feeding people smuggling and exacerbating demographic imbalances.38
One aspect of this control is the cycling of workers through the wealthy economies—that is,
the continual replacement of people prepared to take on low-paying, low-status jobs (includ-
ing aged care) with newer cohorts of migrants. In this way, rich ageing nations can avert the
situation where workers stay on and age in the host economy, offsetting their demographic
imbalances with a continual refreshment of younger migrants. Technologies of border
control, including the proliferation of detention camps, thus become central to the bio-
political strategies by which nation-states shape their age profiles.
Such control, however, can no longer be described as a decentred governmentality that
operates through transversal networks without the surveillance of an overarching sovereign
actor. As Giorgio Agamben argues, the detention camp provides the very diagram of sovereign
power insofar as it is a space of exception that strips its interns of rights and reduces them
to a condition of bare (or merely living) life. Indeed, Agamben presents a very different reading
of the late Foucault than the Anglo-governmentality theorists, tracing the concern with bio-
politics and life itself back to the earliest formulations of sovereignty in the West. Far from
seeing the emergence of modern politics as a decisive break from the paradigm of sovereignty,
he suggests ‘the inclusion of bare life in the political realm constitutes the original—if
concealed—nucleus of sovereign power’.39 It is not my intention here to attempt to settle
this dispute on conceptual skies or even to seek some kind of via media.40 Suffice it to say
that, for Foucault, the distinction between sovereignty and governmentality is at once his-
torical and analytical. As Roberto Esposito explains, this split is the point of maximum
tension in Foucault’s work, at once a moment of fracture and indecision.41 This leaves open
the possibility that sovereignty and governmentality can exist and operate in tandem. What
remains unclear, however, is the precise form this coexistence assumes at the present time.
In an essay entitled ‘Indefinite Detention’, Judith Butler argues that the assumption of a
unilateral and prerogative power by President George W. Bush with respect to the detainees
at Guantánamo Bay enacts a return to a historical time in which sovereignty was indivisible,
before the separation of powers had instated itself as a precondition of political modernity.
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In this scenario, the temporal relation of sovereignty to governmentality involves a kind of
return of the repressed: ‘the historical time that we thought was past turns out to structure the
contemporary field with a persistence that gives the lie to history as chronology’.42 But the bio-
politics of ageing, contained as it is by the twin pincers of global financial governance and
sovereign border control, suggests a very different mode of combination between these
two modes of power. This is where the turn to anti-ageing medicine as an object of research
becomes strategic. The temporal arrangement at stake in the practices that constitute this
emerging health regime are oriented not toward the return of the buried past but toward the
foreclosure of the future. Its temporal configuration is that of prevention or pre-emption—
a strike against a future fate that can only be avoided, or so the fantasy would portend, by
an action that can never occur too soon. And, significantly, the growing commercialisation of
health care is not the only sphere of contemporary life in which this logic of prevention ascends.
Pre-emptive health
Healthy ageing: this is the slogan that governments worldwide have adopted to describe the
transformations wrought to systems of aged care and aged health provision amid the ruins
of the social state. The term proliferates among a number of others that, in their various dis-
cursive contexts, provide alterations on the basic theme: active ageing, positive ageing, suc-
cessful ageing, ageing well, productive ageing. Common to all these notions is an emphasis
on the active effort of individuals to shape their experience of ageing in such a way that it
reduces demands or dependency upon public systems of provision. The categories of nor-
mal and pathological that, for Georges Canguilhem, provided the master binarism of bio-
politics have given way to the mastertropes of the functional and the dysfunctional
(subordinated to various risk assessment profiles and, as in the case of the drug Viagra, the
all-encompassing marker of male heterosexual performance).43 Such an emphasis on ‘func-
tional health’ and wellness is evident in the highest of policy documents. Thus, the World
Health Organisation explains: ‘The need to focus on promoting health and minimising
dependency of older people is a common principle of action. This approach has been termed
“healthy ageing” or “ageing well” ’.44 No longer does the state nationalise the life of its subjects
into a body politic on which it works en masse, in relation to the body politics of other states
competing in similar terms. Rather, within the frame of a generally health-promoting environ-
ment, the state attempts to free itself from some of the responsibilities it acquired across the
twentieth century, enhancing the obligations for individuals and communities to manage
their own biological existences in the context of an increasingly globalised marketplace.45
The effects of this policy shift manifest themselves in several ways. For a start, there is
an increased emphasis on the ageing process as an individual trajectory. As Gullette puts
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it: ‘Aging is about me and me alone’.46 Within protocols of health administration, the bound-
aries between coercion and consent begin to blur as new administrative technologies pro-
mote autonomy, informed choice, and non-directiveness within a general ethos of ‘quality
of life’ (defined within, and measured by, any number of rating scales). Accompanying this
has been a multiplication of images and public messages about ‘healthy ageing’, displaying
an emphasis on active lifestyles, heterosexual companionship and leisured scenarios. Little
wonder then that the policy shift to healthy ageing has seen the emergence of new consumer
options for health maintenance, body modification and the enhancement of capacities. With
the weakening of the contract between the ageing individual and the state, there is at once
a globalisation and personalisation of the risks associated with ageing, meaning that the
maintenance of functional health becomes part of the life work of each active citizen. Anti-
ageing medicine operates precisely in this opening, seeking to match and even displace
the expertise of geriatric professionals with new forms of entrepreneurial practice that aggres-
sively target ageing individuals and seek expanding global markets.
This is not to claim that anti-ageing practitioners are merely money-grubbing individuals
or their patients gullible victims. As Mykytyn shows, these two categories of people merge,
together forming a group that displays the qualities of a social movement, expresses intense
frustration with the current environment of biomedicine, and occupies ‘a tricky space that
maneuvers legitimacy, rebellion, power and subjugation’.47 Within this space, there is room
for genuine care, good work, and a desire to help people who are not, at least at the level
of perception, otherwise receiving help. Nonetheless, these practices emerge within a his-
torical context that mandates their operation within existing frameworks of economic and
political control.
Although anti-ageing medicine has precedents that extend back to the ancient world, its
current proliferation dates to the great wave of globalisation, Internet marketing, and biotech-
nological discovery that swept the world just over a decade ago. In 1992, twelve physicians
formed the American Academy of Anti-Aging Medicine (A4M), dedicating themselves to
approach ageing as a treatable condition or disease. Today A4M boasts over 12 500 mem-
bers in 65 nations. It holds regular seminars, conferences, and training programs in coun-
tries as diverse as Japan, Spain, France, Italy, Belgium, Singapore, Thailand, Korea, Mexico,
Brazil, and the United Arab Emirates. And, while it is a non-profit organisation, it uses its
website to promote a range of anti-ageing products and services, most notoriously the
controversial human growth hormone (HGH). Central to the rhetoric of A4M is its claim
to promote a ‘new health care paradigm’ or ‘extension of preventive health care’ that offers
technical solutions to some of the challenges nation-states face with the ageing of the baby
boom generation.
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We’ve all read the recent cover stories in our favorite news magazines. From Time to Medical
Economics chiming in, America is being summoned to a new call to arms. The gauntlet to
deliver viable alternatives to nursing homes and health care that focuses on treatment of
full-blown states of disease has been cast. To this challenge, anti-aging medicine arrives as
the new health care paradigm, offering a solution to alleviate some of the burden of this bur-
geoning older population. Anti-aging medicine, an extension of preventive health care, is
the next great model of health care for the new millennium. This model is based on the early
detection, prevention, and reversal of aging-related diseases.48
As Stephen Katz points out, such promotion of anti-ageing values and culture dovetails neatly
with discourses of healthy ageing.49 More accurately, these discourses share common ground
in their struggle to represent the changes to ageing in the postmodern life course. It is not
a matter of government policies that seek actively to foster the development of anti-aging
medicine (indeed often there is direct concern about the spread of this field in government
agencies), but the opening of a space in which these enterprises emerge alongside others that
seek to cater to the ageing market.
Many commentators have objected to the ageist and sexist dimensions of anti-ageing dis-
courses. But, while it is important and necessary to analyse these aspects of the field, such
an analysis cannot in itself account for the current flourishing of anti-ageing cultures. That
the historical proliferation of anti-ageing medicine is closely linked to changes in the
governance of later life is suggested by the historian of ageing Carole Haber. She relates the
decline of early twentieth-century anti-ageing treatments such as youth tonics and animal
gland injections to the introduction of pensions and the consequent emergence of a vision
of later life as a time of independence and autonomy. With the financialisation of pension
schemes in an attempt to avoid the so-called age crisis, there emerge new opportunities for
those who promise to slow or forestall the ageing process. The trouble with such promises,
Haber argues, is that, like their earlier precedents, they are embedded within a discourse
of ageing and old people as an economic burden—an ‘apocalypse of ageing’ which demeans
and marginalizes the very process of growing old.50
Such arguments, as illuminating as they are from the historical perspective, suggest a cer-
tain nostalgia for the social state. While correlating, I think accurately, the boom in anti-
ageing medicine with the decline of social welfare, they posit a Fordist or Keynesian norm
against which contemporary capitalism appears excessive or misguided. Consequently, there
is a tendency to draw easy parallels between present and past anti-ageing practices, 
avoid a detailed analysis of current neoliberal modes of governance, and gloss over the 
ways in which welfare mechanisms plug but do not reverse the capitalist neglect of 
ageing bodies.
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As is well known, centralised systems of state provision have to varying degrees given way
to more flexible and globally networked techniques for the control of vital human existences.
But commentaries on this transformation frequently present it either as an inevitable his-
torical necessity (as in the work of Francis Fukuyama) or a regrettable and potentially
reversible disaster (as in the late work of Pierre Bourdieu).51 One consequence of this is a
focus on what has been lost (excessive state power in one version, social equity and justice
in the other) rather than on new or radically transformed strategies for the management of
human lives. Anti-ageing medicine is one such domain of contemporary biopolitical practice.
But to analyse this emerging field solely in terms of the positioning of the health care user as
consumer and the related processes of neoliberal capitalist globalisation is not yet to ask how
the sovereign aspects of contemporary global power come to bear upon it. Particularly in
the current climate of global war, there is a need to explore how emerging forms of bio-
political practice are shaped not only by market forces but also by the actions of sovereign
power. Future research might ask how the logic of prevention, which aims to protect the
present from the future, shapes not only the global emergency of pre-emptive war but also
the norms of citizenship in the democratic polity.
We need, too, to fill in the micro-dimensions of this changing situation through direct
engagement with those involved in the current debates and practices surrounding anti-ageing
medicine. Most pressing is the need to understand how users of anti-ageing medicine per-
ceive the role of governments in the regulation of health provision, the connection of their
practices to the wider dynamics of global power, and their hopes for future biotechnologi-
cal developments—in sum, the reasons why they turn to anti-ageing services instead of (or
as well as) those of geriatric professionals. Such hands-on engagement, proper to the prac-
tices of cultural research, is central to future versions of this project.52
For now, let me end by observing that the well-known motto ‘prevention is better than
cure’ seems out of place under contemporary social conditions. There has emerged a distinct
gap between prevention and cure as both social causes and public actions disappear, leaving
the citizen alone before perennial risks that he/she is obliged to manage within the constraints
of a globalised market. If the logic of prevention or pre-emption fails, the individual is
both responsible and guilty, left to fend within their own networks, however they might be
experienced or constructed. It is thus no surprise that anti-ageing practices and values seem,
despite repeated warnings from governments and scientists, to be gaining an ever-greater
foothold in the everyday lives of the people who comprise ageing populations. The challenge
is to account for lived dimensions of this uptake without reverting to moralistic or purely
technical judgements that oppose popular life extension practices and beliefs from an elevated
perspective—the viewpoint of policy that assumes it always knows better than subjects who
face complexities on the ground. Cultural research is ideally suited for these purposes, since
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